Intrusion Detection Requirements for SOC 2 Compliance
At Agency, we help clients implement intrusion detection controls that satisfy SOC 2 Trust Service Criteria while providing genuine threat visibility across their environment.
One of the most common questions we get at Agency is whether SOC 2 actually requires intrusion detection — and like many SOC 2 questions, the answer depends on understanding the difference between what the Trust Service Criteria technically say and what auditors practically expect. Here is what we have learned from guiding dozens of companies through this exact question.
SOC 2's Trust Service Criteria address intrusion detection through several criteria related to system monitoring, threat identification, and incident response. Unlike prescriptive frameworks that specify particular technologies, SOC 2 uses principles-based language that describes what your controls should achieve without dictating how to achieve it. This gives organizations flexibility in implementation but also creates ambiguity about what auditors expect. In practice, what we see across our client base is that intrusion detection capability — in some form — is expected by virtually every SOC 2 auditor, and the companies that approach it strategically build detection programs that satisfy auditors while providing genuine security visibility.
This guide maps the relevant Trust Service Criteria to intrusion detection, explains what auditors actually evaluate, provides implementation guidance including cloud-native tools, and details how to collect and present detection evidence for your SOC 2 audit.
Relevant Trust Service Criteria
Primary Criteria Related to Intrusion Detection
| Criterion | Full Language | Connection to Intrusion Detection |
|---|---|---|
| CC6.6 | The entity implements logical access security measures against threats from sources outside its system boundaries | Intrusion detection at system boundaries identifies unauthorized access attempts, malicious traffic, and exploitation attempts from external threat actors |
| CC6.8 | The entity implements controls to prevent or detect and act upon the introduction of unauthorized or malicious software | Intrusion detection identifies malware delivery attempts, command-and-control communication, and malicious code execution |
| CC7.1 | To meet its objectives, the entity uses detection and monitoring procedures to identify changes to configurations that result in the introduction of new vulnerabilities, and susceptibilities to newly discovered vulnerabilities | Intrusion detection identifies exploitation of both known and newly discovered vulnerabilities; detection monitoring is a core component of this criterion |
| CC7.2 | The entity monitors system components and the operation of those components for anomalies that are indicative of malicious acts, natural disasters, and errors affecting the entity's ability to meet its objectives | This is the most directly relevant criterion — it explicitly requires monitoring for anomalies indicative of malicious activity, which is the definition of intrusion detection |
Supporting Criteria
| Criterion | Connection to Intrusion Detection |
|---|---|
| CC7.3 | The entity evaluates security events to determine whether they could or have resulted in a failure of the entity to meet its objectives (security incidents) and, if so, takes actions to prevent or address such failures — detection events trigger the evaluation process described in this criterion |
| CC7.4 | The entity responds to identified security incidents by executing a defined incident response program — intrusion detection findings are the primary input that activates incident response |
| CC3.2 | The entity identifies risks to the achievement of its objectives across the entity and analyzes risks as a basis for determining how risks should be managed — intrusion detection data feeds into risk assessment by providing empirical evidence of threats targeting the organization |
| CC4.1 | The entity selects, develops, and performs ongoing and/or separate evaluations to ascertain whether the components of internal control are present and functioning — detection capabilities are among the controls that should be periodically evaluated for effectiveness |
How Auditors Map Detection to Criteria
What we tell clients is that auditors do not look for a single "intrusion detection" checkbox. Instead, they evaluate your detection capabilities across multiple criteria. A well-implemented detection program provides evidence for CC6.6, CC6.8, CC7.1, and CC7.2 simultaneously, while a poorly implemented one may fail to adequately address any of them.
| Auditor Question | Criterion Being Evaluated | What Good Evidence Looks Like |
|---|---|---|
| How do you detect unauthorized access attempts at your system boundary? | CC6.6 | Network monitoring logs showing detection of blocked and alerted external threats; firewall and IDS/IPS alert records |
| How do you detect malicious software in your environment? | CC6.8 | Endpoint detection alerts, malware scanning results, and evidence of blocked malware delivery attempts |
| How do you monitor for new vulnerabilities being exploited? | CC7.1 | Detection rules configured for known CVE exploitation patterns; threat intelligence feeds integrated with detection tools |
| How do you identify anomalous activity that may indicate a security incident? | CC7.2 | SIEM correlation rules, behavioral anomaly detection, alert review records, and incident investigation examples |
What Auditors Expect
Minimum Expectations vs Best Practices
| Area | Minimum Auditor Expectation | What We Recommend | Why We Recommend More |
|---|---|---|---|
| Detection coverage | Some form of monitoring for systems within the SOC 2 scope | Detection capability covering all production systems, network boundaries, and critical internal services | Partial coverage creates gaps that auditors may question and that threat actors will exploit |
| Alert review | Evidence that detection alerts are reviewed periodically | Defined SLAs for alert review (critical: 1 hour, high: 4 hours, medium: 24 hours, low: 72 hours) with evidence of adherence | Undefined review timelines lead to alert fatigue and missed incidents; SLAs demonstrate operational maturity |
| Incident escalation | Documented process for escalating detected threats | Alert routing to specific teams with automated escalation when review SLAs are not met | Manual escalation processes break down under real-world conditions; automation ensures consistency |
| Detection testing | Not always explicitly required | Annual testing of detection rules through simulated attacks or purple team exercises | Untested detection creates false confidence; auditors increasingly ask whether detection has been validated |
| Log retention | Logs retained for the observation period at minimum | 12-month minimum retention for security logs; longer for forensic-relevant data | Short retention makes incident investigation impossible and limits the evidence available during audits |
Common Audit Findings Related to Detection
In our experience, these are the intrusion detection-related findings we see most frequently in SOC 2 audits.
| Finding | Frequency | Impact | How to Prevent |
|---|---|---|---|
| No evidence of alert review | Very common | Exception or qualified finding for CC7.2 | Implement documented alert review process with timestamped evidence of review activities |
| Detection does not cover all in-scope systems | Common | Exception for CC7.1 or CC7.2 | Map detection coverage to the SOC 2 system boundary; ensure every in-scope system has appropriate monitoring |
| No documented incident escalation path from detection alerts | Common | Observation for CC7.3/CC7.4 | Define and document the path from detection alert to incident response activation |
| Detection rules have not been updated during the observation period | Moderately common | Observation for CC7.1 | Establish a quarterly detection rule review and update process |
| No evidence that detection capability has been tested | Increasingly common | Observation for CC4.1 | Conduct annual detection testing — simulate attacks and verify alerts fire correctly |
IDS/IPS Implementation Guidance
Cloud-Native Detection Tools
For cloud-native organizations — which represent the majority of our SOC 2 client base — cloud provider detection tools provide the fastest path to compliance.
AWS
| Service | What It Detects | SOC 2 Relevance | Cost Model |
|---|---|---|---|
| AWS GuardDuty | Malicious activity and unauthorized behavior across AWS accounts; analyzes CloudTrail, VPC Flow Logs, and DNS logs | Addresses CC6.6, CC7.1, CC7.2 — detects unauthorized access, reconnaissance, credential compromise, and data exfiltration patterns | Per-million events analyzed; typical cost $100-$1,000/month for most environments |
| AWS CloudTrail | API activity logging across all AWS services | Foundation for CC7.1, CC7.2 — provides the log data that detection tools analyze | Free for management events; data event logging at $0.10 per 100,000 events |
| AWS Security Hub | Aggregates findings from GuardDuty, Inspector, Macie, and partner tools; provides compliance scoring | Centralized view for CC7.2 evidence; demonstrates aggregated detection capability | $0.0010 per finding check per month |
| Amazon Inspector | Automated vulnerability assessment for EC2 instances and container images | Supports CC7.1 — identifies vulnerability exposure in running workloads | Per-instance and per-image pricing; typically $500-$3,000/month |
| AWS WAF | Web application firewall with rule-based and managed rule set detection | Addresses CC6.6 — detects and blocks web application attacks at the boundary | $5 per web ACL + $1 per rule + $0.60 per million requests |
Azure
| Service | What It Detects | SOC 2 Relevance | Cost Model |
|---|---|---|---|
| Microsoft Defender for Cloud | Threat detection across Azure resources; container security; vulnerability assessment | Addresses CC6.6, CC6.8, CC7.1, CC7.2 — comprehensive cloud workload protection | Free tier available; enhanced features at $15/server/month and per-resource pricing |
| Azure Sentinel | Cloud-native SIEM with AI-powered threat detection, hunting, and automated response | Addresses CC7.1, CC7.2 — centralized detection with correlation across data sources | Per-GB ingestion pricing; typically $2,000-$20,000/month depending on log volume |
| Azure Network Watcher | Network monitoring, diagnostics, and flow logging | Supports CC6.6, CC7.2 — provides network-level visibility for detection | Per-check pricing for monitoring; flow log storage costs apply |
| Microsoft Defender for Endpoint | Endpoint detection and response for servers and workstations | Addresses CC6.8, CC7.2 — host-level threat detection and response | Included with certain Microsoft 365 plans; standalone at $5.20/device/month |
GCP
| Service | What It Detects | SOC 2 Relevance | Cost Model |
|---|---|---|---|
| Security Command Center (SCC) | Threat detection, vulnerability identification, and security posture management across GCP | Addresses CC6.6, CC7.1, CC7.2 — centralized security findings and threat detection | Standard tier free; Premium tier pricing varies by organization size |
| Chronicle Security | Cloud-native SIEM for threat detection, investigation, and response | Addresses CC7.1, CC7.2 — centralized log analysis and correlation with Google threat intelligence | Annual subscription pricing based on data volume |
| VPC Flow Logs | Network traffic metadata logging for VPC networks | Supports CC6.6, CC7.2 — provides network-level visibility | Per-GB pricing for generated logs |
| Cloud Armor | DDoS protection and web application firewall | Addresses CC6.6 — boundary protection with detection and blocking | Per-policy and per-request pricing |
Multi-Cloud and Hybrid Environments
For companies operating across multiple cloud providers or hybrid environments, centralized detection is critical. What we recommend is selecting a SIEM or detection platform that can ingest data from all sources and provide a unified view.
| Approach | Tools | Best For | Estimated Annual Cost |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cloud-native tools per provider + centralized SIEM | GuardDuty + Defender + SCC feeding into Datadog Security or Elastic Security | Multi-cloud organizations with security engineering resources | $40,000-$120,000 depending on scale |
| Managed detection and response (MDR) | Arctic Wolf, Expel, or Red Canary covering all environments | Organizations without dedicated security operations | $50,000-$200,000 depending on scope |
| Open-source SIEM with cloud integrations | Wazuh as the centralized platform with cloud provider log integrations | Budget-conscious organizations with security engineering capability | $15,000-$50,000 (primarily infrastructure and labor costs) |
SIEM Integration
Why SIEM Matters for SOC 2
In our experience, auditors increasingly expect some form of centralized log analysis and correlation — a SIEM or SIEM-equivalent tool. Individual detection tools generate alerts in isolation, but a SIEM provides the correlation and aggregation that demonstrates mature detection capability.
| SIEM Capability | SOC 2 Evidence Value |
|---|---|
| Log aggregation from multiple sources | Demonstrates comprehensive monitoring coverage across the system boundary (CC7.2) |
| Correlation rules that identify multi-step attacks | Shows sophisticated detection capability beyond simple signature matching (CC7.1) |
| Alert dashboards and reporting | Provides visual evidence of monitoring activity for auditors (CC7.2) |
| Incident timelines | Demonstrates the investigation workflow from detection to resolution (CC7.3, CC7.4) |
| Retention and search | Enables evidence retrieval for any point during the observation period (supports all criteria) |
SIEM Options by Company Size
| Company Size | Recommended SIEM Approach | Expected Cost | Why |
|---|---|---|---|
| Early-stage startup (10-25 employees) | Cloud-native tools with built-in alerting (GuardDuty + CloudWatch Alarms) | $2,000-$8,000/year | Minimizes cost and operational overhead while satisfying basic detection requirements |
| Growth-stage (25-100 employees) | Cloud-native tools feeding into a lightweight SIEM (Datadog Security, Panther, or Elastic Cloud) | $15,000-$40,000/year | Provides correlation and centralized alerting without requiring dedicated security operations headcount |
| Mid-market (100-500 employees) | Full SIEM deployment (Splunk Cloud, Elastic Security, or Sentinel) with defined detection engineering process | $40,000-$120,000/year | Scale requires centralized detection; dedicated detection rules and investigation workflows |
| Enterprise (500+ employees) | Enterprise SIEM with dedicated security operations team or MDR service | $100,000-$300,000+/year | Complex environments require extensive detection coverage, 24/7 monitoring, and rapid response capability |
Evidence Collection for Audits
Building an Evidence Package
What we recommend is preparing the intrusion detection evidence package well before the audit fieldwork begins. Here is the evidence we help clients compile.
| Evidence Item | Description | How to Collect | Typical Format |
|---|---|---|---|
| Detection architecture diagram | Visual representation of where detection capabilities are deployed relative to the system boundary | Create or update during detection implementation; review quarterly | Network diagram with detection sensors highlighted; Lucidchart, draw.io, or similar |
| Detection tool configuration | Screenshots or exports showing enabled detection services, configured rules, and alert routing | Export from detection tool admin console | Screenshots with timestamps; configuration export files |
| Alert review records | Evidence that alerts were reviewed within defined timeframes throughout the observation period | Ticketing system exports (Jira, ServiceNow, PagerDuty) showing alert triage and resolution | Filtered ticket exports showing detection-related tickets with timestamps |
| Incident records triggered by detection | Evidence that detection alerts led to incident investigation and response | Incident management records linked to detection alerts | Incident reports with timeline showing detection as the initiating event |
| Detection metrics dashboard | Summary of detection activity over the observation period — alert volumes, response times, false positive rates | SIEM dashboard export or custom report | Dashboard screenshot or PDF export covering the observation period |
| Detection rule update records | Evidence that detection rules were reviewed and updated during the observation period | Change management records for detection rule modifications | Change tickets or version control logs for detection rule changes |
| Detection testing evidence | Records of detection capability testing (simulated attacks, purple team exercises) | Test plan and results documentation | Test report showing scenarios tested, expected results, and actual results |
Evidence Presentation Tips
In our experience, how you present detection evidence matters almost as much as the evidence itself. Auditors are evaluating large volumes of evidence across many controls, and well-organized evidence accelerates the review process and reduces follow-up questions.
| Tip | Why It Matters |
|---|---|
| Map each evidence item to specific Trust Service Criteria | Helps the auditor understand how the evidence satisfies the criterion without having to make the connection themselves |
| Include timestamps in all evidence | Demonstrates that the evidence falls within the observation period |
| Show the full lifecycle: detection to response | Evidence that shows an alert being generated, reviewed, escalated, investigated, and resolved is far more compelling than evidence of alert configuration alone |
| Prepare a detection coverage summary | A one-page summary showing which systems are covered by which detection tools prevents the auditor from questioning whether coverage gaps exist |
| Include at least one incident example | Walking the auditor through a real (even minor) incident from detection to resolution demonstrates the entire process is operational |
Key Takeaways
- In our experience, SOC 2 criteria CC6.6, CC6.8, CC7.1, and CC7.2 collectively create a strong expectation for intrusion detection capability — while no single criterion uses the phrase "intrusion detection system," auditors consistently expect detection controls as evidence for these criteria
- What we tell clients is that the most frequent detection-related audit finding is not missing tools but missing evidence of alert review — deploying detection is necessary but demonstrating that alerts are reviewed and acted upon within defined timeframes is what auditors actually evaluate
- We recommend cloud-native detection tools (AWS GuardDuty, Azure Defender, GCP Security Command Center) as the foundation for cloud-native SOC 2 environments — these tools provide the fastest path to detection capability with the lowest operational overhead, and auditors accept them as appropriate detection controls
- In our experience, companies pursuing SOC 2 should implement centralized log aggregation even if they do not deploy a full SIEM — the ability to search, correlate, and present logs from across the system boundary is increasingly expected by auditors and is essential for incident investigation
- What we recommend is preparing intrusion detection evidence as a complete package mapped to specific Trust Service Criteria, including architecture diagrams, alert configuration, alert review records, incident examples, and detection metrics — this structured approach reduces auditor follow-up questions significantly
- In our experience, detection coverage must align precisely with the SOC 2 system boundary — systems within scope that lack detection monitoring create audit exceptions, while spending on detection for out-of-scope systems provides no compliance value
- We help clients select the right detection tools for their cloud environment, configure alerts that generate auditor-ready evidence, build operational alert review processes, and compile evidence packages that satisfy SOC 2 auditors across CC6.6, CC6.8, CC7.1, and CC7.2
Agency Team
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